في منتصف خمسينات القرن الماضي ازدهرت المقاهي الشعبية وتطورت فاعلية الجلوس فيها إلى نمطيات إنسانية في مجالات متعددة منها الفنون الموسيقية والغناء، حيث اتخذ مطربو المقامات ومادونهم من المقاهي ملاذاً لفعالياتهم الفنية، فيما اتخذ الأدباء والصحفيون المقهى ملاذاً لنقاشاتهم وقراءاتهم، فصار لكل مجموعة أصوات أدبية أو فنية مقهى خاص تتردد عليه فئة محددة دون غيرها باستثناء الاستضافات التي قد تحصل بين الفينة والأخرى كأن يصطحب هذا الفنان أو ذاك الأديب زميلاً له أو قارئاً معجباً برواية أو قصة أو مقال أو هاو لقراءة المقام أو مستمع إليه. كان التقليد يقضي بقيام الفئة الفنية أو الأدبية الاحتفاء بالضيف الزائر من خلال تكريس الحديث في تلك الجلسة معه دون غيره تصاحبها الطلبات الكثيرة لأنواع المشروبات التي يختص بتقديمها المقهى مثل الينسون والشاي والكاكاو والقهوة أو بعض المرطبات.

مقاهي الانترنت ما دمنا بصدد الحديث عن مفهوم المقاهي كحالة اجتماعية متعارف عليها منذ نشوء المدن الحضرية، فلابد من التوقف عند حالة ظهرت حديثاً، وانتشرت في المدن الكبيرة انتشاراً هائلاً فاق ما موجود أو ماحققته المقاهي الشعبية من حيث العدد أو النكهة أو الموقع بكثير من الأشواط. تلك هي مقاهي الانترنت التي تفردت بحالة واحدة عن المقهى الشعبي بكونها تستقبل زبائن من أنواع خاصة، زبائن صامتين، بعيدين عن الثرثرة والقيل والقال، بعيدين عن لعب الطاولة، إذ إن رواد مقاهي الانترنت هم رواد صامتون، منعزلون داخل مكعبات صغيرة لا يزيد حجم الواحدة منها بأكثر من متر مربع واحد. يتعاملون مع شاشة الكمبيوتر وفق حالة مزاجية خاصة أو وفق تأملات طويلة يقضونها بالتحديق فيما تظهره لهم تلك الشاشات العجيبة الغريبة. وهنا نتساءل هل إن هذا النوع من المقاهي الحديثة التي لا يتوفر في الكثير منها مشروبات مثل الشاي أو القهوة ولا تعتمد على مردودات الألعاب الشعبية أو الزيارات المفاجئة لضيوف يحلون على روادها القدامى، هل بإمكانها الصمود أمام تاريخ وتقاليد المقاهي الشعبية التي أسست لها قاعدة عريضة من الزبائن الدائمين عبر أزمنة طويلة قد تزيد على عمر جيلنا الحالي إلى أجيال الآباء أو الأجداد؟

الجواب على ذلك هو نعم، والنعم هذه تأتي لصالح مقاهي الانترنت التي غزت أسواق وشوارع المدن الكبيرة والمباني، بما في ذلك بصفة خاصة مدينة القاهرة.

مقاهي الانترنت في مدينة القاهرة حريصة على مثل هذه التقاليد الشعبية كما حصل مع المقاهي التقليدية خلال السنوات الأخيرة من القرن الماضي والسنوات السابقة في هذا القرن.
ومن خلال جولة معمقه الأهداف والرؤى بين مقاعد مقاهي الانترنت في القاهرة أو في أي مدينة في مصر و بالنظر إليها من خلال جولاتي في مقاهي الإنترنت داخل القاهرة أو بإحدى المحافظات سواء الساحلية أو بصعيد مصر نجد التقاليد موجودة من حيث الوضع في الازدهار والنمو وأنواع الزبائن والفئات العمريةوعلى المستويات الثقافية والفكرية كافة.
الزبائن هم غير زبائن المقاهي التقليدية، قبل أي اعتبار، فإن المقاهي التقليدية في المائة عام الماضية لم تكن لاستقبال السيدات أو الفتيات للجلوس بها أو ممارسة حياتهن كما يفعل الرجال، و قد اختلفت الصورة بالقاهرة و الإسكندرية وبدأت تتلقى الفتيات مع بدء افتتاحمقاهي الانترنت.

ويقول أحد مالكي مقهى الإنترنت: وجود الفتيات في المقاهي لا يقتصر على التصفح أو الكشف عن المواقع، كما يفعل الرجال، بل إن تواجد الفتاة أو السيدة داخل المقهى يأتي من خلال رؤيتي الدقيقة والمتابعة بغرض محدد منها البريد الالكتروني أو التراسل عبر (الدردشة) والحديث من خلال الكاميرا وفي حالات أخرى التحدث عبر الكاميرا مع قريب لها يسكن في دولة عربية أو أوربية، فالكثير من الفتيات أو السيدات يلجأن إلى إدارة المقهى لمساعدتهن بتحقيق اتصال مرئي أو مكتوب مع الأقارب في قارات العالم.
وأهم خدمات الانترنت التي يبحث عنها روّاد المقاهي هي بلا شك، خدمة إقامة اتصالات مباشرة بالصوت والصورة مع أقارب وأصدقاء في الخارج. من المألوف والعادي في هذا المجال رؤية عائلة بكل أفرادها، تأتي إلى مقهى الانترنت من أجل إقامة هذا الاتصال مع أحد أبنائها، خصوصاً من العاملين في دول الخليج. هؤلاء يحرصون – غالباً – على إحضار أطفال، خصوصاً من حديثي الولادة لوضعهم أمام الكاميرا كي يراهم والدهم المقيم في الخارج.

لكنّ معظم روّاد هذه المقاهي شباب تحت سن الثلاثين، يجلسون أمام أجهزة الكومبيوتر لساعات طويلة، بينما كانوا في ما مضى يمارسون هوايات أخرى مختلفة تماماً.

وفي حمّى التنافس بين المقاهي المتعدّدة، عمد أحدهم إلى الإعلان عن خفض سعر ساعة الانترنت إلى النصف تماماً بعد الساعة العاشرة ليلاً وحتى الصباح. هذا الإعلان سرعان ما تجاوب معه أصحاب المقاهي الأخرى، فصار تقليداً يتبعه الجميع. هنا نشأت مشكلة جديدة: تخفيض السعر إلى النصف دفع بالغالبية العظمى من الشباب والمراهقين إلى تأجيل زياراتهم للمقاهي إلى ساعات الليل. ما جعل أعداداً متزايدة من الأهل يتذمرون من عادة جديدة غزت بيوتهم وهي عودة أبنائهم المراهقين إلى البيت في ساعة متأخرة من الليل، بل مع ساعات الفجر أحياناً.

أما الفتيات، فيحضرن في النهار فقط. وعمدت بعض المقاهي إلى خلط الفتيات مع الشباب من دون تمييز في حين حرصت مقاه أخرى على اعتماد تنظيم الطابقين، الأرضي للشباب، والثاني للفتيات.




ففي مدينة لا يصل عدد سكانها إلى مئة ألف، يصبح لافتاً أن يتواجد فيها ما يربو على عشرين مقهى، تصل أعداد أجهزة الكومبيوتر في أصغرها إلى عشرة على الأقل، فيما يتجاوز العدد الثلاثين في مقاه أخرى.

يبقى أن الجميع اتفقوا على أن المقهى هو المقهى. لاشك أن مقهى أيام زمان له طقوسه حيث اشتهرت مدينة القاهرة كغيرها من المدن المصرية بكثرة مقاهيها الشعبية ولكن بعد انتشار مقاهي وصالات الانترنت في السنوات القليلة الماضية والتي بدأت تستقطب شرائح واسعة ومتنوعة من الأهالي، بدأت الشيخوخة تزحف إلى المقاهي التقليدية ولكن هناك مقاه لازالت تحافظ على أصالتها بل وتنامت الحركة فيها خصوصاً في المناطق السياحية كمنطقة الحسين. والسنوات الأخيرة يصح أن يطلق عليها في مصر اسم «سنوات الإنترنت بامتياز» خصوصاً مقاهي الإنترنت. ولم تعد هذه الظاهرة تقتصر على القاهرة والمدن الكبرى، بل انتشرت في شتّى أنحاء البلاد وصولاً إلى أصغر القرى، لتصبح المتنفّس الشبابي الفعلي والرئيسي.

ليس هناك من خطر يهدد الديمقراطية في أي مجتمع سوي محاولة استخدام الديمقراطية في غير موضعها وعدم الالتزام بالمفهوم الصحيح للحرية. الديمقراطية داخل المؤسسات الشرعية هي الوسيلة الفعالة لصنع حوار بين الرأي والآخر كخطوة ضرورية تسبق صناعة القرار‏.‏.

ومعني ذلك أنه لا يمكن لأي مجتمع أن يطمئن إلي سلامة الممارسة الديمقراطية إلا إذا نشأ توافق وطني عام تلتزم به كل القوي والنخب السياسية‏,‏ وجوهر هذا التوافق اعتماد القنوات الشرعية للحوار التي لا يجوز تخطيها أو ممارسة العمل السياسي بعيدا عنها‏.وذالك‏ خصوصا في ظل هجمة شرسة تريد نشر الفوضى وتستهدف أن تنتقل ممارسةالديمقراطية من قبة البرلمان ومنتديات الأحزاب إلي مظاهرات الشوارع والحواري والأزقة‏.‏

إن السبيل الوحيد لحماية الديمقراطية من أي أخطار تهددها هو البدء بتهيئة المناخ الصحي لتفاعل الرأي والرأي الآخر تحت مظلة الإدراك بأن المحظور الوحيد في الممارسة الديمقراطية هو سوء استخدام الحرية.‏

إن الديمقراطية ليست اضرابات واعتصامات ولا هي مجرد لافتات وشعارات فقط وإنما هيفي الأساس منهج للتفكير والسلوك المتحضر وعنوان للالتزام بالضوابط التي تتفق مع مبادئ الشرعية الدستورية واحترام القانون العام‏!‏

والذين سمحوا لأوطانهم أن يصبح الشارع مسرحا للجدل والفوضى السياسية بدلا من ساحة البرلمان هم الذين تصل إلي أسماعنا صرخاتهم بعد أن حل الخوف محل الأمان والقهر محل الاقتناع بعد اتساع مساحة الشقاق والصراع علي حساب الحوار السليم بين الرأي والرأي الآخر‏!‏إن الديمقراطية ليست غاية في حد ذاتها ولكنها أفضل وسيلة عرفها الإنسان لبناء الحوار الموضوعي داخل المجتمعات المتحضرة بهدف تقريب المسافات وليس تضخيم المتناقضات والبحث عن الايجابيات وليس انتقاء السلبيات.

As the Arab Spring grinds on into autumn, the Russians are asking once again whether they should follow the policy "If you can't beat them, join th'em",

Muammar Gaddafi's demise is all but a done thing, carried out with a UN blessing, however dubious, and only belatedly opposed by Russia and China. Russian policy-makers are now wondering if their quasi-principled condemnation of Western-backed regime change in Libya was not just Quixotic but downright stupid.

The new Tripoli government has denied that National Transitional Council Information Minister Mahmoud Shammam signed a secret agreement with France in March through the Qatari government whereby French companies would control more than a third of Libya's oil production in return for Paris's early and staunch support for the rebels. However, even as Russia recognised the NTC last week, Abdel-Jalil Mayouf, information manager of the rebels' Arabian Gulf Oil Company, warned, "We don't have a problem with Western countries like the Italians, French and UK companies. But we may have some political issues with Russia, China and Brazil."

Gaddafi's impending fate is now fuelling Western efforts to topple Bashar Al-Assad in Syria, with France openly arming and organising the rebels, and a European boycott of Syrian oil in place as of Friday. The latter is potentially more devastating than hosting dissident conferences in Paris, as almost all of Syria's oil -- a third of its total export revenues -- goes to Europe.

The burning question now is "Should Russia should accede to Western plans for the Middle East?" To "learn from its mistake" in Libya and dump Al-Assad immediately, whatever the internal dynamics of Syria may be? The whole relationship of Russia to the Arab Spring is now heatedly discussed, with many critical of Western machinations but just as many worried that Russia will only lose out if it stays aloof.

The two camps represent the two poles in post-Soviet Russian thinking: the Eurasianists vs the Atlantists. The former trying to put Russia at the centre of an independent anti-Western coalition. The latter are happy to throw in the towel, to accede to the Western hegemony which characterises the postmodern imperial order unfolding since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

There are powerful forces in Russia behind both views. Atlantist enthusiast Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was responsible for the success of UN Resolution 1973 allowing the NATO bombing of Libya. In March, he overrode broad Russian opposition including by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who denounced the Western invasion as a new Crusade. Medvedev had to fire Russian ambassador to Libya Vladimir Chamov when the latter sided with Putin. Medvedev now warns Al-Assad of a "dire fate" if he continues his campaign against the opposition.

Those who want to accede to the Western agenda complain that in Libya Tatneft and Gazprom Neft will have to abandon their projects. "We won't have anything; Libya's oil market will shift in favor of Italian ENI. After them, the American and European companies," whines Uralsib Capital analyst Alexei Kokin. The Russian Railways contract to build a 550km high-speed rail line from Sirte to Benghazi also appears to be under review by the new government in Tripoli.

Libya is far away, and was never much of a Soviet-Russian ally. In Syria, Russian economic and security stakes are much higher. Not only is Syria one of Russia's largest arms export customers, with current and pending deals valued at $10 billion, but Al-Assad's regime is also a significant Russian security partner in the Middle East. The Russian navy is dependent on Syrian ports to sustain its operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Russia's NATO Ambassador Dmitri Rogozin scoffed at the idea that the West had any altruistic motives in invading Libya. He told the EUobserver on 2 September that the Libya experience shows NATO will now "expand towards its southern borders", and though he was happy NATO had stopped expanding eastward, "we cannot trust [that] NATO will not exceed the mandate and NATO bombs will not be dropped on Damascus."

Concerning the proposed UN resolution against Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, "This is a call for a repeat of the Libyan scenario. The BRICS nations will not allow this to happen." There is no question for the Russians that honest elections are now unavoidable in Syria in future, but "we strongly believe it is unacceptable to instigate the Syrian opposition to continue boycotting suggestions to start a dialogue." Russia is unwilling to contemplate another Western-incited civil war and invasion leading to regime change. For the moment, the Eurasianists have the upper hand.

Underlying the Atlantist-Eurasianist debate is the fate of the entire Western project to transform the Middle East, which has been in the works since the 1980s with the rise of the neocons. This plan was to bring about a controlled chaos in the region, creating a series of weak statelets that would benefit a strong Israel. Oded Yinon's "A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s" proposed the policy of divide-and-conquer. Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah described the Israeli policy in 2007 as intended to create "a region that has been partitioned into ethnic and confessional states that are in agreement with each other. This is the new Middle East."

But given the horrors of this policy in action since 2000, the burning question for Russian politicians is not just "Should we accede to Western plans for the Middle East?" but rather "Are Western plans in the Middle East going to succeed, and is Russia helpless to influence them?"

Iraq and Afghanistan loom large. Russian Profile analyst Alexandre Strokanov fears that "the real war and even more horrifying suffering still lay ahead for the Libyan people" and warns that weapons from Gaddafi's arsenal could well end up in terrorist hands. Neither the US nor the EU are in any position to get involved in another "nation-building project". In any case, the new Libyan government will have to show its fiercely proud people that it is independent from all foreign powers.

While Italy and Britain were cruel colonial taskmasters in Libya before independence, Russia has no such imperial baggage. Russian officials met with both sides throughout the stand-off to try to negotiate a ceasefire, and have nothing to be ashamed of. If it's any comfort to Kokin, even enthusiastic support by Russia of the bald imperial venture to unseat Gaddafi would hardly have done Tatneft or Russian Railways much good.

It is clear now the whole Arab Spring is not as spontaneous as appeared at first glance. While the regimes across the region were indeed corrupt and dictatorial, they were all supported by the West. But so was the opposition.

The moment came when they were perceived as passed their due date, and with the neocons in office by 2000 and PNAC's "new Pearl Harbour" on the horizon, it was possible to proceed with Yinon's plan to create dynamic chaos in the Middle East. The Arab Spring is, in an eerie way, a natural conclusion to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A sort of "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em", American style.

It has taken various forms so far, with a breezy boot to Zein Al-Abidine bin Ali in Tunisia, a pair of handcuffs to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, a burnt face to Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, impending assassination to Gaddafi, and who-knows-what to Al-Assad. The only ones to escape unharmed are the Gulf sheikhs and the kings of Morocco and Jordan, who are so compliant that they need only a tap on the shoulder to do Washington's bidding. Oh yes, Algeria's President Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika is still hanging on, but not even the neocons dare to overthrow him and reopen civil war wounds from the 1990s.

That is not to denigrate the revolutionaries across the region, nor to dismiss their heroic struggles to achieve independence in the face of the Western intriguers. Among the prominent new leaders are Muslim Brotherhood leaders such as Tunisia's Rachid Ghannouchi and Egypt's Essam El-Erian. Their popular Renaissance and Freedom and Justice parties are projected to win the plurality of seats in upcoming elections, and they have no use for the imperialists. Then there is rebel military leader in Tunisia Abdullah Hakim Belhaj who plans to take the US to court for torturing him and then rendering him to Libya. There are few secular heroes in the region that can vie with the long-suffering Islamists.

The neocon wars of the 2000s were the steel fist approach to subduing Islam: kill millions and terrorise the survivors. But they have been a disaster and made the US a pariah. Israel's endless wars against Lebanon and the Palestinians have also made it a pariah around the world. This option is no longer feasible.

Russia inherits fond memories across the region as the anti-Zionist Soviet Union's successor. It now has the chance to gain long term credibility as a principled partner not only in the Middle East but to nonaligned countries everywhere, and should stare down the imperialists.

أثارت التطورات السريعة التى شهدتها شبكة الإنترنت خلال السنوات الأخيرة، سواء فيما يتعلق بتطور المستوى التقنى أو التوسع الضخم فى عدد المواقع الإلكترونية وتوزعها على مختلف المجالات الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والسياسية والثقافية والدينية، وظهور المواقع المتخصصة والمنتديات الحوارية، فضلا عن اتساع قاعدة مستخدمى الإنترنت فى الدول العربية أثارت عددا مهما من الإشكاليات النظرية حول مدى مساهمة شبكة الإنترنت فى دفع عملية الإصلاح والتحول الديمقراطى فى الدول العربية

وقد ساد حتى وقت قريب اتجاه رأى أن اتساع نطاق ظاهرة الإنترنت فى الدول العربية لن يكون له تأثير سياسى ملحوظ، سواء فيما يتعلق بتشجيع عملية التحول الديمقراطي، أو فيما يتعلق باحتمالات تصاعد العمل السياسى العنيف ضد النظم السياسية الحاكمة. استند هذا الافتراض إلى عدد من المبررات. كان أولها افتقاد شبكة الإنترنت ذاتها الديمقراطية وما تعكسه من تكريس لما يمكن تسميته ظاهرة «الانقسام الرقمي» بين فئات المجتمع، بمعنى الانقسام بين أقلية تمتلك القدرة على النفاذ إلى الإنترنت، وأغلبية أخرى ما زالت تفتقد هذه القدرة، بما يزيد من احتمالات تعميق الأزمات الاجتماعية داخل المجتمع، خاصة أن النفاذ إلى الشبكة لا يعتمد فقط على الشروط المادية (أجهزة الكمبيوتر، والتليفون أو خط الإنترنت المباشر) ولكنه يعتمد أيضا على الظروف الاجتماعية، خاصة فى ضوء ما انتهت إليه بعض الدراسات من أن نسبة مهمة ممن تتوافر لديهم القدرة على النفاذ إلى الإنترنت لا يستخدمونها لأسباب اجتماعية وسيكولوجية تتعلق بمدى قدرتهم على التفاعل معها.  

ومن ناحية أخري، كانت هناك شكوك قوية حول مساحة الحرية الحقيقية المتاحة على الإنترنت، فرغم صعوبة السيطرة الحكومية على المواقع الإلكترونية بالمقارنة بالكثير من الوسائل الإعلامية الأخري، فإن هذا لم ينف تزايد قدرة واتجاه الحكومات إلى فرض مزيد من الضبط والسيطرة على المواقع الإليكترونية، سواء من خلال وضع القوانين والتشريعات المنظمة لعمل هذه المواقع، أو من خلال التوسع فى استخدام آليات الفلترة والحجب والتدمير للمواقع الإلكترونية ذات المحتوى الذى لا يتوافق مع مصالح النخبة الحاكمة. وقد ازدادت قدرة الحكومات على
«السيطرة الإليكترونية» فى ضوء التطور المتسارع فى تكنولوجيات الضبط والسيطرة والفلترة والمراقبة، وتطور جدل مهم حول الحاجة إلى تنظيم وضبط الشبكة من خلال تطوير تشريعات قانونية محددة، جنبا إلى جنب مع الاستفادة من تكنولوجيات المراقبة. ورغم وجود اتجاه يدعو إلى رفض فكرة المراقبة والتنظيم تلك، فإن الاتجاه المؤيد لها لقى رواجا ملحوظا عقب أحداث سبتمبر 2001 وامتداد الحرب ضد الإرهاب إلى ساحة شبكة الإنترنت ذاتها وتطور مفاهيم مثل «الجهاد الإليكتروني» والإرهاب الإليكتروني. الخ. ورغم أن معظم الحكومات العربية لم تنتقل بعد إلى وضع تشريعات مقيدة أو ضابطة لعمل المواقع الإليكترونية، فإنها راكمت خبرة مهمة فى مجال المراقبة السياسية للمواقع الإليكترونية.
ولا يقتصر الاتجاه إلى الاستخدام المكثف لتكنولوجيات المراقبة والفلترة
(الترشيح) على الحكومات فقط، فقد ذهب هذا الاتجاه إلى أن عملية الفلترة تلك ستحدث أيضا على مستوى الأفراد أنفسهم فى ضوء كثافة المعلومات ذات المحتوى السياسى والتوجهات المتناقضة، الأمر الذى يضطر الفرد ذاته إلى استخدام التكنولوجيات والبرامج المتاحة لفرز تلك المعلومات واستبعاد المعلومات والآراء التى لا تتوافق وميوله وتوجهاته السياسية والثقافية، واستقبال المعلومات التى تتوافق فقط وتلك التوجهات وتدعمها. ويترتب على عملية الضبط والفرز الذاتى تلك ظاهرتان مهمتان تتصلان بالتحول الديمقراطى والعمل السياسى «الإنترنتي»، الأولى هى تزايد فرص عزلة مستخدم الإنترنت عن التيارات والاتجاهات السياسية الأخرى وعدم التعرض للأفكار الجديدة. والثانية هى دعم فرص حدوث حالات الاستقطاب السياسى بين الجماعات السياسية داخل المجتمع وتراجع فرص تطور حالة من التوافق العام حول مختلف القيم الأساسية بما فى ذلك قيمة الديمقراطية ذاتها.
أيضا أثارت الكثير من الدراسات الشكوك حول افتراض دعم الإنترنت لفرص مشاركة المواطن فى عملية صناعة القرار السياسى ونشر فرص التأثير داخل المجتمع، استنادا إلى أن النظم الديمقراطية ذاتها لا تضمن للمواطن الفرد القدرة على التأثير فى الأحداث السياسية وعملية صنع القرار من خلال الوسائل الإعلامية التقليدية. ومن ثم، لم يكن من المتوقع - وفق هذا الاتجاه - أن يترتب على اتساع نطاق الإنترنت تغيير جوهرى فى هذا الواقع، بل على العكس فإن هذا الانتشار وما يترتب عليه من تقليل الحواجز أمام عملية نشر المعلومات والآراء الفردية سيؤدى إلى المزيد من إضعاف قدرة الرأى الفردى على التأثير فى عملية صناعة القرار بسبب حالة التزاحم الشديدة بين الآراء الفردية. ومن ثم فقد تدعم الإنترنت حالة «التفكيك» داخل المجتمع بدلا من بناء «التوافق العام».
ورغم جاذبية الحجج والفرضيات التى طرحها أصحاب الاتجاه السابق، فقد جاءت موجة الثورات العربية التى اعتمدت على الإنترنت بشكل عام، وعلى المواقع التفاعلية (الفيس بوك وغيرها) بشكل خاص، لتضع دقة ومصداقية هذه الفرضيات أمام تحد كبير. وبشكل عام، فقد تجاهل هذا الاتجاه النظر إلى الإنترنت باعتبارها «عملية» process جديدة ذات سمات خاصة لابد أن تترك آثارها على مختلف الظواهر الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والسياسية داخل المجتمع، وأن هذه العملية توفر بدورها مجموعة من الأدوات التى يمكن استخدامها بطريقة تعظم القدرات السياسية للفاعلين فى مواجهة النظام السياسى فى سياق عملية الصراع السياسى بين الطرفين.
ويمكن فى هذا الإطار طرح عدد من التفسيرات التى حولت الإنترنت ليس فقط إلى ساحة للعمل السياسى ولكن أيضا إلى أداة فاعلة فى إدارة هذا الصراع. يتعلق أولها بالميزات النسبية التى توفرها شبكة الإنترنت فيما يتعلق بتخفيض تكلفة المعاملات والاتصالات وتكلفة الحصول على المعلومات وتبادلها، وفرص إجراء تلك الاتصالات على نطاق واسع، سواء من جانب الجمهور أو من جانب الفاعلين السياسيين فى ظل تواضع تكلفة إنشاء وتسجيل المواقع الإليكترونية والبحث الإليكترونى عن المعلومات، وتواضع تكلفة إرسال رسائل البريد الإليكترونى وغيرها من المعاملات الإليكترونية. أضف إلى ذلك ما وفرته الإنترنت من فرص مهمة لممارسة حريات التعبير والعمل السياسى للقوى السياسية المحجوبة عن الشرعية أو القوى السياسية التى قد تطرح رؤى سياسية وإصلاحية تتجاوز السقف المتاح من جانب النظام السياسي. وقد استطاعت الكثير من القوى السياسية فى الدول العربية بالفعل استخدام الإنترنت كساحة بديلة للعمل السياسى من خلال تشكيل المنتديات والجماعات السياسية الافتراضية، والتغلب على القيود السياسية والقانونية المفروضة على حريات التنظيم السياسي، وتجاوز القيود المادية التى واجهت عمليات الاتصال والتنسيق.
ويشار فى هذا الإطار أيضا إلى ثلاث سمات أساسية للإنترنت، هي: الطبيعة التفاعلية، وغياب السلطة المركزية المنظمة للإنترنت ومن ثم صعوبة السيطرة والرقابة على محتوى المواقع الإليكترونية بالمقارنة بوسائل الاتصال التقليدية، وأخيرا اتساع نطاق القاعدة الاجتماعية المستخدمة للإنترنت وعدم التزامها بالحدود الجغرافية والسياسية. وقد أدت هذه السمات إلى تحول مستخدم الإنترنت من مجرد متلق أو مستهلك مجهول للرسالة الإعلامية إلى مشارك فاعل فى تشكيل تلك الرسالة، وتحول طبيعة الاتصال من مجرد اتصال نخبوي- نخبوى أو اتصال نخبوي- جماهيرى أو حوار أقلية ـ أغلبية إلى اتصال جماهيري- جماهيري، وتحول الحوار الإليكترونى إلى حوار ندى لا يعكس تفاوت القدرات السياسية والاقتصادية بين المتحاورين بقدر ما يعكس مدى توافق/ تناقض الرؤى والآراء المطروحة بشأن القضية موضوع الحوار. وعلى العكس مما ذهب إليه الاتجاه السابق من ارتباط الإنترنت بظاهرة التفكيك والاستقطاب السياسى وغياب التوافق العام، فقد أدى انتشار النفاذ إلى الإنترنت داخل المجتمع وسيطرة نمط التفكير الشبكى إلى إضعاف التوزيع الهيراركى للسلطةوالتحول من الدولة الهيراركية إلى المجتمع الشبكي.
وقد ساهم فى تعظيم التأثيرات السياسية الإيجابية السابقة للإنترنت عوامل عدة، فبالإضافة إلى اتساع نطاق النفاذ للإنترنت وحجم الشرائح الاجتماعية المستخدمة له، فقد تركز هذا التوسع داخل قطاع الشباب بالأساس. ومن ناحية، ثالثة فقد استندت الافتراضات المتشائمة حول العلاقة بين الإنترنت والعمل السياسى فى العالم العربى إلى انتشار أنماط محددة من استخدامات الشبكة تدور حول اختزالها فى مواقع الترفيه والتسلية (الألعاب، الأغاني، الأفلام، ممارسة القمار، المواد الإباحية. الخ) مقابل تراجع أهمية الإنترنت كمصدر للمعرفة وجمع المعلومات وتبادل الآراء والجدل بشأن قضايا الإصلاح والتحول الديمقراطي. الخ. ورغم انتشار أنماط الاستخدام الترفيهى للإنترنت بالفعل فى العالم العربى بالمقارنة بالدول الديمقراطية المتقدمة، فإن هذا ربما انسحب على المراحل الأولى لانتشار الإنترنت، وقد حدث على ما يبدو تحول واضح فى أنماط استخدام الشبكة فى العالم العربى خلال السنوات الأخيرة، فى اتجاه ارتفاع معدلات استخدامها كوسيلة وكساحة للعمل السياسي، الأمر الذى يطعن فى مقولة إن الانترنت تمثل عالما سياسيا افتراضيا.

The trial of the "Pharaoh on the Nile" has captured the imagination of the street in Egypt and beyond. For the second time the ousted former president Hosni Mubarak appeared in court on Monday 15 August, and this seemed for many to symbolise the successful conclusion to the popular protests that lasted over the last six months.

However, the point I want to raise is that the trial does not serve the cause of justice and furthermore that it will have a negative impact on the immediate political future of Egypt. The slogans of "down with the regime" voiced during the early stages of the protests remained adamant only until the overthrow of Mubarak. The fall of the regime meant that the core demand of the protestors has been met. This should have been followed by a second phase focusing on political, economic and social issues, thus beginning the process of restoring dignity to the Egyptian citizen and that of Egypt itself.

Besides interrupting, and possibly impeding, the restoration of stability and consequent progress on both the domestic and international levels, the trial will have an immediate effect on voting in the looming elections in the country. There are several considerations I would like to air in support of this contention. Factor one: the image of Mubarak's appearance before the court as an ailing man. Factor two: the fact that the military remain in power. Factor three: the Muslim Brotherhood policy of "wait and see" is likely to benefit from the rift amongst the ranks of the protestors.

To expand on the first of these factors, we should examine Mubarak's appearances in court and their effect. On both occasions when he appeared before the court, wheeled in on his hospital bed, he looked frail and humiliated. This helped to elevate the degree of sympathy towards him. His image as a dictator, a corrupt and tyrannical leader, began to lose currency, as a wave of sympathy on the street started to perceive him as merely "the poor ill old man."

As time passes Mubarak's image will, to some extent, transform into that of a victimised old man of 83 years. This in itself is not detrimental if it does not bring about discord amongst the people. However, his second appearance in the courtroom triggered clashes between his supporters and those who were advocates of his trial. A number of his supporters chanted, "Mubarak is not Saddam" and "he is Egyptian until death". Again, this alone will not be tantamount to a major rift, and it will not unduly affect the outcome of the trial, but it will impinge upon the universality of the spirit of the protests that initially prevailed. It will also have an impact on the long-term zeitgeist in the Egyptian political landscape.

The success of the pending elections in Egypt is not dependent simply on the number of voters, but also on a politically acute and enlightened mentality in order to lay the foundations for a new system. It is only through an informed electorate that the best results for the country can be achieved. Yet, such a position may be undermined by the rift emerging around Mubarak's trial and the flourishing of latent, ambivalent prejudices. It would be naïve to assume, despite the sheer size of the protests in the country, that Mubarak lacks supporters. The few voices reverberating that the ousted leader is "Egyptian until death" and that "he is not Saddam" may gather momentum, especially when people start to associate the dignity of Mubarak with that of Egypt itself.

The haste at which Mubarak has been brought to court is certainly on social grounds rather than in the service of justice. If so, the concept of justice loses its essence, as it hangs in the balance between the authority of the military and the demands of the protestors. This point becomes more marked when considered alongside the second of the three factors identified above.

As long as the military forms the transitional government, composed of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), effectively the government, then a state of "civil mentality" will not dominate on the streets of Egypt. By civil mentality I mean the focus on the post-Mubarak period to which the masses have aspired. Even if the protestors go home, collective consciousness will remain charged with anxiety and uncertainty. Obviously, this will have an effect on the country's move towards a stable and long-lasting democratic form of governance. I should mention at this point that the top generals in the army who monitor and govern are old brothers-in-arms with the ousted leader. Their political influence has only increased over the last six months, and it will do so further while there is no civil government in power that could help minimise their role.

It is also notable that to date the military have not brought to trial any further elements of the old regime. And while their grip on power continues, their economic privileges stay intact. Their popularity has so far resided in the fact that it is a "draft military" made up of the people. But the SCAF has also come to resemble a political body that has taken on many of the characteristics of the old regime. The military have become notorious for the trials of activists and journalists. Journalists Hossam al-Hamalawy and Rasha Azab have been summoned by the prosecution, and Asmaa Mahfouz, who was accused of inciting violence against the military and insulting members of the SCAF, was referred to a military court and later released on bail.

The presidential candidate Mohammed ElBaradei has responded to these developments on his twitter account that "military trials for young activists, while Mubarak & Co. stand before civilian courts, is a legal farce. Don't abort the revolution." The recent clashes between the protestors and the military's supporters are evidence of this. On Saturday 23 July, protestors moved from Tahrir Square in Cairo towards the defence ministry, the headquarters of the SCAF, in order to voice their demands for more freedom for the civilian government of prime minister Essam Sharif and also to condemn the military trials. More than 250 people were hurt in the clashes. Interestingly, the slogans during that protest were "down with the military," and they branded the leader of the SCAF, Hussein Tantawi, as being "an agent of America." It is inevitable that while the military are part of the political machinery this will influence the outcomes of future civil governance in the country. It is already the case that disagreement has been rife between different groups while preparing for the upcoming parliamentary elections.

While these elections are regulated and administered by the army, the political environment is emphatically militaristic and confrontational. The government of Essam Sharaf exists in the shadows of a military presence, and hence the climate is not dissimilar to the days of Mubarak. This point alone suggests there has been little progress in civil society.

I expand on my third factor with the contention that the Muslim Brotherhood or any other religiously oriented group in the Arab world always profits from any vacuum created in the social and political landscape. While the Muslim Brotherhood played no major role in the instigation or the process of the protests, they are likely to harvest the fruits of this unrest. Their overall policy is based on a "wait and see" principle. They have remained heavily on the side of the military, with the understanding that this will please the masses. However, the Brotherhood's stance towards Mubarak's trial is straightforward.

They were keen on it, actively requested it, and they got it. That straightforward narrative was interrupted, though, when at the second hearing of Mubarak's trial, judge Ahmed Rifaat announced that "in the public interest, the court had decided to stop the television broadcast of the court sessions beginning on 5 September 2011 until the announcement of the sentences." Voices on the street then denounced the removal of the cameras from the courtroom. This was seen as a betrayal of the protestors who were killed and disloyalty to their families. Further accusations were made that there is a deal between the military and Mubarak. Such a charged atmosphere extends the potential rift between the people and the military. It is easy to see how the Muslim Brotherhood will benefit from such circumstances. In the case of the political parties, although there are over 20 registered parties in the country, they remain politically unorganised. Apart from their support for the encompassing cause of the protesting masses, these parties pursue their own agendas and are factional in nature.

Moreover, the government of Essam Sharaf, as mentioned above, has been overshadowed by the SCAF, and this curtails the performance of civil institutions. The clashes between opponents and supporters of Mubarak in front of the court testify to the critical point that has been reached in relation to this. The Muslim Brotherhood is established and well organised, and it is poised to take up the role of "rescuer." The group's tactics include cunningly keeping a low profile, while at the same time waiting for gaps to fill in the structure of ongoing debate and protests.

It has established the Muslim Brotherhood political party to run in the next parliamentary elections, scheduled this autumn, and appointing a Coptic Christian as its vice-president. This is an obvious gesture to quell any fears that the group will use religion as a tool in its domestic political agenda. However, in its rhetoric on foreign policy and the future of Egypt's relationship to its neighbours, the Brotherhood will beat its rivals in the elections in an easy fashion. When asked in a recent interview about Egypt's treaty with Israel, Youssef Nada, a long-time strategist for the Brotherhood, stated that the "treaty should be rewritten, to be fair to everyone."

Such statements are welcome in Egypt as the treaty has long been viewed as an alliance between Mubarak and Israel rather than between the two countries. The treaty was signed in 1979; Mubarak came to power in 1981 and became its de facto guardian. For many Egyptians, it is a treaty very much identified with Mubarak's strong ties with Israel. Therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood plays popular tunes these will find a wider audience on the street.

So far, the spirit of protest has been subject to reason: "down with the regime for dignity and justice." The reasoning underpinning this has been the exchange of a regime that hindered justice for a new system that could restore it. Nonetheless, the courtroom in the case of Mubarak does not necessarily symbolise justice and seems more a vengeful form of catharsis for the people. Justice is known as the "first virtue of social institutions." While the SCAF still holds the momentary authority, one would assume that the spirit of wider social institutions lacks virtue.

Rational political protest must be guarded against becoming merely an instrument of revenge. That is, objectivity ought to prevail rather than the satisfaction of the deeply entrenched cultural and religious ethics of the Arab world. The true spirit of the early protests must remain authoritative and not be subjugated to over-hastiness and popular appeasement. I say that because these protests have not yet become fully incorporated into the judicial body, and they cannot be so while the military is still governing. Thus, the trial of Mubarak could remain that of an ailing old man.

Original sin is a Christian theological doctrine that is still creating a lot of debate. However, more relevant here is another non-religious meaning of the term, particularly that given in Webster's Dictionary, which defines original sin as "a wrong of great magnitude." In other words, the term describes the gravest crime or action possible that a person can commit, or the crime that reduces him to a fallen state. Original sin is the sin of all sins and the one that a person is solely and uniquely accountable for committing.

People may differ about which was the most serious sin committed by ousted former president Hosni Mubarak. Personal corruption, attempts to hand over power and political corruption are the major alleged crimes most commentators cite. Nevertheless, these things do not describe what took place. Corruption on the part of Mubarak was a case of the kleptocracy that had reached an unprecedented extent in Egypt under the former president's rule, and it is in these terms that the creation by Mubarak and his son Gamal of a power base formed of co-opted military and security leaders, top government officials and leading businessmen should be viewed.

Such networks cascaded down through the administration, forging a web of bureaucratic corruption that entangled nearly every aspect of daily life. We should be courageous in acknowledging that kleptocratic habits of this sort trickled down to touch many civil servants at almost every level and that corruption is not just an elitist characteristic or trait. Instead, corruption under Mubarak's rule became so pervasive in the privileged and unprivileged classes alike that it permeated both the private and the public sector while manifesting itself in the form of petty as well as grand corruption.

Political corruption was not the original sin committed by Mubarak, as he resorted to classical methods to curb potential opponents. In other words, there was nothing unique about such behaviour as forms of political corruption have been prevalent in Egypt since the establishment of the modern state if not earlier. Elections have been marked by fraud many times in our recent history.

The Wafd, for example, the most popular party in the so-called liberal age before the 1952 Revolution, ruled for fewer than six years in the period from 1923 to 1952. The longest Wafd government only lasted two and a half years, and this was formed on 4 February 1942 under the auspices of the British after their famous ultimatum to King Farouk. Political corruption is part of the DNA of the security apparatus, and it is transferrable from one generation to the next, becoming dominant at the request of the ruler, whether a king or a president.

Mubarak's original sin was not his grooming of his son for power either, as this has become an established regional practice. Egypt was a late adopter of this sweeping trend, though Mubarak would have been influenced by other Arab leaders even to the extent of initially categorically rejecting the whole idea. Yet, from denial to tacit approval to relentless support Mubarak finally endorsed the project of seeing Gamal as his successor. This project, though, met with fierce opposition from nearly everywhere, including from the army, as has recently been disclosed.

Instead, Mubarak's original sin was his disastrous management of the transfer of power to his successor, a sin that made Egypt face a non-peaceful succession of power for the first time in its modern history since the days of Mohamed Ali. Mubarak, through his conscious and deliberate maneuvers aiming at keeping himself as the only presidential option, exposed the state to immense threats, causing the country to face possible anarchy as a result of Mubarak's doing everything he could to maintain and consolidate his tenure. Nothing stopped him from continuing such a path through his five presidential terms in office, leaving the country subject to uncertainty, chaos and anarchy when he left.

In the same context, Mubarak spared no efforts in extending his life cycle as president by attempting to make his son the de facto and de jure candidate to succeed him. In other words, the preparation of Gamal as Mubarak's successor should be envisaged as part of Mubarak's original paradigm to maintain power. All his other sins are just the tip of the iceberg. It is in this one that we can see his lust for power. The establishment of the kleptocracy was just a means to an end of building a power base that could represent the inner core of the regime, while the political corruption was just the tool Mubarak used to maintain his rule.

Mubarak's five terms in office can be divided into two phases, in which the first three terms (1981-1999) did not see the naming of a successor despite gossip about names like Abu Ghazala, Rifaat al-Mahgoub, Amr Moussa, al-Ganzouri, and so on. No one emerged as a potential successor, and years lapsed while Mubarak was still the premier. In his early years when asked about a vice-president Mubarak repeatedly said that it would depend on his finding the right person, adding that former president Anwar al-Sadat had been lucky in finding him.

Apart from the outright narcissism, Mubarak's reply signals straightforward disrespect for the whole people of Egypt. Mubarak intentionally avoided appointing a vice-president in order to further consolidate his image as the sole indispensible option at the head of the state. He was the victim of five separate attempts on his life during his time in office, but none of these made him think of appointing a vice-president. Instead, these attempts only augmented his sense of insecurity and intensified his seclusion from society. Even the most famous, and perhaps the only announced, assassination attempt, that of 1995 in Addis Ababa, though it provoked sympathy, also stirred criticism as the entire political system was made to look precarious and dependent on one man's survival.

Mubarak's last two terms in office, actually those of Mubarak & Co, witnessed a fully-fledged version of Mubarak's original sin, as he shared the prerogatives of the presidential office with his insufferable son. He left the capital and spent most of his days at a holiday resort while Mubarak Jnr. dealt with state affairs. The shift to what was called the free-market economy was gradually adopted under Gamal Mubarak's de facto rule, in which the fruits of crony privatisation and stock market manipulation, as well as the selling off of land, the establishment of import monopolies and ironically also import substitution, only benefitted the privileged members of the lucky caste formed of the regime's clients

It was during this period that the culmination of the neo-liberal economic policies that gradually resulted in the alienation of growing numbers of poor as well as unemployed people from the system took place, these people then sporadically directing their resentment against the growing inequalities. The regime's failure to address the country's growing economic woes radicalised many of the bloggers who started to organise around defending social causes. Meanwhile, the regime resorted to safety valves to let out the pressure on the system, as can be seen in the conduct of the People's Assembly, the media syndicates and the various associations that enjoyed relative freedom of speech and even of opposition during the period. Nevertheless, there were still red lines, and it was here that the regime could eschew its artificial tolerance and use its traditional repressive measures instead.

Security threats increased during Mubarak's last two terms in office, given the growing number of the unemployed and the disproportionate increases in the security forces, a fact that made many writers claim that the police were concerned to secure the regime and not to protect the people. Such economic hardships, together with the emphasis on security, loom large as a legacy of the Mubarak era. Obviously, they have been intensified as a result of the catastrophe that happened to the security apparatus during and in the aftermath of the January Revolution. Yet, the fact remains that they are the outcomes of Mubarak's policies, emanating from his insistence to remain in power either directly or indirectly through Mubarak Jnr.

In the early days of the Revolution, Mubarak stressed that were he to suddenly disappear from power the alternative would be chaos and /or Islamist fundamentalism. Those were Mubarak's own words when describing the situation that would take place were he to leave office. In other words, Mubarak stated his original sin. And instead of taking responsibility for pushing the state to this appalling turn, all the former president could do was offer to complete his term in office. Though too late even from an absolutely Machiavellian perspective, Mubarak's last-minute endeavour to remain in office led him to sacrifice his son Gamal's ambitions as a presidential candidate. Nobody really thought of Gamal as a candidate, but the father's decision regarding his son reflects his greed for power. He did everything he could to make himself into the indispensible man for Egypt, at least for its security if not for its well-being.

As such, the original sin of Mubarak was to put the republican system, if not the state and its institutions, at risk of near collapse. Once more, it was Mubarak's confession of the inevitability of chaos in the event of his resignation that should be taken as evidence for judging his past behaviour regarding the succession of power. Mubarak was quite aware of the implications of his sudden disappearance from the political scene, something that is enough unequivocally to indict him. Prior knowledge of the precariousness of the political situation was one of his responsibilities, and his attitude belongs to the category of damned if you do, damned if you don't.

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that what we are witnessing today in terms of chaos, insecurity and economic stagnation are the outcomes of Mubarak's original sin, and they were evident in the last years of his rule. Egypt was considered as a failing states by many commentators at the time, who highlighted the deplorable state of the regime. Its swift collapse and the removal of the strongman at its head was a clear illustration of its intrinsic weaknesses and vulnerabilities. These are still casting dark shadows on many aspects of life, which is why many people are still uncertain about the Revolution and its impact.

Mubarak also did his best to project an image of indispensability on the regional and global levels, and he received endless support from major allies in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Israel France, and most important the US. Mubarak of Egypt, or the Egypt of Mubarak, rarely deviated from the agreed-upon foreign policy objectives laid out by his allies in nearly all local, regional or global issues and conflicts.

Mubarak betrayed the oath he was sworn to uphold. Article 79 of the last constitution includes the following oath: "I swear by Almighty God to uphold the Republican system with loyalty, to respect the Constitution and the law, to look after the interests of the people fully and to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the motherland."

But in contradiction to this oath, Mubarak made endless efforts to pave the way for his son as his only successor in a straightforward betrayal of the republican system which does not allow the inheritance of power. It was the great journalist Heikal who pointed to this basic violation of the constitution by Mubarak, though his remarks did not stir much reaction. Nevertheless, Mubarak was responsible for violating the constitution long before the affair of his son. He consciously and deliberately obstructed the emergence of any successor throughout his tenure in office in a way that put the whole state, including its political system, in jeopardy. In his pursuit of exclusivity as a candidate and indispensability as president, Mubarak adopted many stratagems such as refraining from appointing a vice-president, the elimination of other potential candidates and the game of various constitutional amendments.

In 2007, Mubarak confirmed that he would continue serving his country, meaning as president, as long as his heart was beating. On 28 January 2011, he stated that he intended not to nominate himself for a sixth term in office, though he implied in his announcement that something else was being prepared. The destinies of nations cannot be left prey to the whims of leaders that announce one day that they will continue for ever and the next that they are stepping down. Perhaps the 28 January announcement was a deliberate attempt to introduce more fog into an already cloudy political scene, serving a hidden agenda to move Gamal into the presidential seat. Exposing Egypt to such uncertainty added more fuel to an already highly volatile situation. What else could be expected than the kind of revolution we witnessed in January?

Some may argue that Mubarak is hardly an exception in the region, since many others have pursued similar ambitions. Syria was a typical illustration. However, there is an ocean of differences between the two cases, which would require another article to discuss. In the meantime, Mubarak squandered a golden opportunity to bring about peaceful transformation towards a more pluralistic political system with functional institutions and a vibrant civil society. For the first time in its history, according to Mubarak and his chorus of supporters, Egypt has not been at war for decades. This should have offered the regime ample time to establish a more open political system based on the peaceful transfer of power.

Take the year 1990 when the formerly communist countries started their move towards democracy, for example. Many of these have now joined the EU with its solid criteria for admission and membership, while Egypt only succeeded in becoming a member of the Francophonie during the same period. This kind of transformation of fortunes, which nearly all the formerly communist states enjoyed, passed Egypt by under the slogans of stability, sustainability and development. However, in truth the last two decades were dedicated to the consolidation of Mubarak's own personal power and then the preparation of his son for the presidency.

Looking back at Egypt's contemporary history, it has only been Mubarak who has left the question of the succession unanswered. Every other ruler from Mohamed Ali onwards has had a regent or vice-president there to act as a successor. Clearly, there have been times of uncertainty as well as power struggle, yet in almost all cases there has been a smooth transfer of power. The idea of the head of state is something that is inherent in Egypt's political culture: it was Egypt and the Egyptians who invented the phenomenon of the Mamluks to overcome the Egyptian fear of anarchy. Mubarak should not have been asked to change the political culture, or to remedy its many inadequacies. However, he should at least have followed his predecessors in settling the matter of the succession.

Mubarak's health did not deter him from continuing his indifference to the uncertain destiny of Egypt either. The incident of his collapse while in parliament, the repeated heart attacks, and the major surgery of 2008 all made no impact upon him, not causing him to change his mind and appoint a vice-president to run the country in case of force majeure. Another dimension, though a strictly personal one, is Mubarak's tragic loss of his grandson. He was out of office for weeks, and he confided to his attorney that he had been devastated by this great loss that almost left him unable to function. This should have caused him to appoint a vice-president.

Many have argued that Mubarak was not willing to appoint a vice-president because he was not willing to impose anyone on Egyptians, leaving the choice of his successor to the people themselves. However, this was not the case with Nasser and Sadat, and Mubarak's choice of this direction was a deviation from the trend set by his predecessors. Had he started to institute a new political system in which people had a genuine say in the political process, then such arguments would ring true. But this was not the case, since Mubarak did barely anything to increase political participation and popular engagement.

In fact, the opposite was the case, as Mubarak passed two constitutional amendments tailored to exclude any other potential candidate from standing as president, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood. The amendment of 2007 was unique to the extent that it looked almost like a classified ad that had been written to fit only Mubarak or his son. Apart from Gamal, had we had elections in September 2011 who else could have been elected given such arrangements? This last option can also be viewed within Mubarak's stratagem of making himself the sole and exclusive option. Realising that he could not continue forever, he adopted a new stratagem that could extend his life cycle and allow him the best conditions in his final years if he could not rule. Mubarak therefore cloned himself, offering us his son as the sole and exclusive candidate for the presidency.

Mubarak's original sin is deeply rooted, and unfortunately it has serious complications. Egypt is not a banana republic, nor is it a developing country that can be treated in the way that it has been by someone who was hailed on his election in 1981 in the aftermath of the assassination of former president al-Sadat.

damianprofeta: En la reda acaba de entrar @andresrepetto tarareando "va pensiero" a volumen de ópera. Y, ojo, salió el sol.

damianprofeta: Dónde votar en Santa Fe: Consultar el padrón electoral - Notio http://t.co/OVI7laC vía @NotioNoticias

damianprofeta: Santa Fe - Dónde votar: Consultar el padrón electoral - Notio http://t.co/iqOEvZb vía @NotioNoticias

damianprofeta: Nada mejor que una lluvia copiosa y Queen sonando a todo volumen. Me retrotrae a cuando era más ciudadano y menos periodista

damianprofeta: a mí sólo me anda mal el google analytics?

damianprofeta: RT @Javinjavin: Alumnas que en un oral se hacen las gatas para aprobar #fail

damianprofeta: RT @Dark3vin: El mono fotógrafo que sacudió las reglas del copyright http://feedly.com/k/pQoHyW

damianprofeta: No te pierdas Chile vs Venezuela. Miralo online con nosotros acá: http://bit.ly/n0wUFu #CA2011 #CopaAmerica

damianprofeta: EN VIVO: Se vienen los penales de Brasil vs Paraguay, empatados en cero: Miralos online: http://bit.ly/pyQVB2 #CA2011